The decision to keep the Indian Air Force’s fighters and bombers out of an offensive role during the 1962 conflict with China remains one of the most consequential military questions surrounding the war. The issue was revisited last week by former IAF Chief Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa at the Indian Military Heritage festival hosted by the United Service Institution.
Air Chief Marshal Dhanoa said that “specialists” had advised Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru against employing the IAF offensively during the conflict. He also argued that responsibility for the decision should not be placed on Nehru alone. His remarks have drawn renewed attention to the command assessments and operational concerns recorded in the Ministry of Defence’s official history of the war.
“It’s not right to just blame Nehru for the decision,” Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa said.
The Ministry of Defence’s book, History of the Conflict with China. 1962, was released for restricted circulation in March 1993. The official account records that both Army Headquarters and IAF Headquarters advised against the use of offensive air power. It says the eventual consequences of that decision cannot be established with certainty, while also observing that a detailed examination could regard it as one of the major mistakes of the war.
“The exact outcome of the decision to (not) use offensive air support remains in the realm of speculation, but a careful analysis points to it being possibly one of the major mistakes of this ill-fated war,” the Ministry of Defence’s official record says.
The record also states that there is no accurate or authentic documentation explaining the thinking behind the decision to refrain from offensive air support. However, it details requests made by field formations and the responses from higher headquarters.
Requests from the field were rejected
On 9 September 1962, IV Corps at Tezpur in Assam sought offensive air support. Army Headquarters rejected the request and stated categorically that close air support would not be used. A signal sent to IV Corps on 7 October cited a lack of “advantage” as the reason.
Army Headquarters assessed that Chinese forces would retaliate if Indian aircraft were used offensively. It also feared that Chinese action could interfere with Indian transport flights, on which the troops were solely dependent. A similar signal was sent to the Army’s Western Command, which was responsible for Ladakh and had also requested offensive action.
| Formation or headquarters | Action recorded | Date or period |
|---|---|---|
| IV Corps, Tezpur | Requested offensive air support | 9 September 1962 |
| Army Headquarters | Rejected the request and ruled out close air support | Before 7 October 1962 |
| Army’s Western Command | Also requested offensive action for the Ladakh sector | During the 1962 conflict |
The official record further describes the involvement of Air Marshal HC Dewan, who was a Group Captain in 1962 and served as Director of Operations at Air Headquarters. It says he sent a note to the IAF Chief on the proposal for offensive air support. The account places this discussion alongside the recommendations made by the Army and IAF headquarters, showing that the decision emerged within the higher military command structure rather than from a single political instruction alone.
- Army Headquarters rejected IV Corps’ request for offensive air support.
- The recorded concern was that Chinese retaliation could threaten transport flights supporting Indian troops.
- The Ministry of Defence’s official history says the decision’s precise outcome remains a matter of historical assessment.
The episode remains significant in India’s military history because it concerns the relationship between political authority, service advice and the use of air power in a high-altitude conflict. The Ministry of Defence’s record does not present a definitive counterfactual outcome, but it preserves the sequence of requests, objections and decisions that shaped the employment of Indian military power during the 1962 war.
