22 years have not healed the wounds of a nation which lost over 500 of its young and dashing youth. Despite being grossly ill-equipped and underprepared the Commanding Officers of our Infantry Battalions, Young Officers, Junior Commissioned Officers, and valiant Soldiers of the Indian Army, coupled with the close air support of ace fighter pilots of Indian Airforce and the silent yet poignant role of Indian Navy the nation won a hard-fought victory against an adversary that caught us unawares and off guard.
The valour, dedication, and sheer professionalism of our young military men in olive greens, whites and blues stood out in stark contrast with the institutional apathy and laxity displayed by the higher echelons of the nation’s higher defence, intelligence, bureaucratic and political framework. Some believe that our boots on the ground were fighting two parallel wars; one; against a determined adversary which leveraged our fault lines with weaponized deceit and second; against the callousness of the greying men who had thrust them into the jaws of death without the necessary tools.
Mission Victory India spoke to Brigadier Rajiv Williams, Yudh Seva Medal (Retd), who had served in the ‘Special Media Cell’ at the Army Headquarters in New Delhi during the course of the 1999 Kargil Conflict. He later commanded the famed 56 Mountain Brigade after the war and has both a ringside and historical view of the limited war.
Recounting his experiences from the bloody conflict, the Brigadier began to narrate, “Having been inducted into the ‘Special Media Cell’ created at the Army Headquarters for the ‘Kargil war’ and immediately thereafter taking over command of the same Brigade at Drass. The events which led to the limited war, the way it panned out as also post war defence consolidation all need to be put into perspective and I will try and do just that from my standpoint.”
He went on to say, “I am from ‘The Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry Regiment’, the Regiment with troops exclusively recruited from the (then State of Jammu and Kashmir) and have seen the Valley at its best as also at its worst. The first time I noticed an extreme shift in the attitude of local youth, who were always rather respectful toward my Regiment, was in 1987, on return after a very successful tenure at Siachen, where my Battalion, 8 JAK LI, created history by capturing Pak Quaid post at an altitude of 21, 143 feet and defending Bila Fondla three months later with Musharraf leading the attack over three days and nights.
“The Unit had moved to the Glacier from its permanent location at Khrew, which is approx 30 kms from Srinagar and on our return to our permanent location I found the distinct change in the body language of the youth with a display of disgust and resentment toward the Army including toward my own Regiment, which was always given much respect by the locals. What we saw soon after was a disturbed environment with a strong movement for ‘Independence of Kashmir’, which resulted in terrorism in the State supported by Pakistan. The heightened terrorist activities were somewhat controlled by mid 1990s with the election process taking place in 1996.
“The overt terrorist activities were brushed aside as mere sporadic incidents and the so-called ascendancy of the Army became a moot point of dissent amongst the silent community. The distance between the Army and the civilians became more pronounced with restricted movement taking place outside BB Cantt, the ‘Old Airfield’ and other complexes. Such restrictions led to limited interaction between the uniformed frat and the civilians resulting in a chasm between the two. The element of suspicion between the two became more apparent and the long military convoys through the streets of Srinagar were offensive in nature, with a ‘Danda man’ banging the body of the vehicle or the whistling to get the civilian vehicles ‘Out of the way’ as if ‘His Highness, the Lordship – Shahanshah’ was passing through.
“This kind of a behavior of the military was found to be rather discomforting with the local formation commanders encouraging such a practice while the locals resisted such attempt, which had a direct effect on their inert pride. Such practices as a part of a misplaced so called a local ‘Policy of Prestige’ at the local commander’s level resulted in a deeper divide in the sum game of military – civil relations. The overall intelligence network failed, and Pakistan took full advantage of the situation, exploited the low hanging fruits, and occupied selected heights along the ridgelines where gaps existed in the Indian defences.
“Such intelligence failure gave way to 3 Infantry Division’s misplaced priority and tasking the formations and units under it to beautify Ladakh and develop parks and laying emphasis on greening areas around Drass, Kargil, Batalik and Biamah. All these areas came under the operational control of 121 Independent Mountain Brigade responsible from Mushok in the West to Biamah in the East and it is in these very areas where Pak infiltration took place.
“The uncorroborated intelligence inputs on enemy movement along ridge lines received at 3 Infantry Division from 121 Independent Infantry Brigade were not taken seriously and remained as missing links while building the overall threat in the Sector. What amazes me that even reports of enemy artillery shelling at regular intervals on Drass – Kargil road did not raise alarm bells at the Headquarters with higher accuracy levels. This should have been a major indicator as the shelling was becoming more accurate leading to the fact that someone from atop was directing the artillery fire.
“However, none of such inputs received the attention required and all such incidents were considered as routine and not of much significance in the buildup of the true operational picture. The firing it must be analyzed intensified from mid-1998 onward and all vehicle movement that was taking place in the day light hours along the 400 meters open stretch of road near Bhimbat, which was visible to the enemy was targeted. The movement policy changed, and all transit restricted after last light at least between the two locations and an adhoc transit camp was established in Drass.
“Having said that, I am of the opinion that we missed the most important indicator on Pakistani movement along the ridges leading to Drass, Bhimbat and Balalik areas. The so-called Pak supported terrorists, which actually were troops of the hardy, well trained Northern Light Infantry, occupied the gaps. This was an absolute failure on the part of all Intelligence agencies, be it the Research and Analysis Wing, Intelligence Bureau and Military Intelligence.
“Even the ground report received by local Unit Commanders from the local graziers, about unfamiliar people being observed on the heights of Kargil and Bhimbat went unheeded with no action taken to confirm the information. The focus especially around Marpola and Drass town as also some other areas in Batalik and Biamah was on area development and beautification. Hence such like inputs received from locals or shepherds grazing in higher reaches were not taken seriously and I guess there were no real area domination patrolling taking place, in fact there is a possibility of perhaps misreporting by fudging situation reports.
“The wakeup call came when Saurabh Kalia’s 4 JAT patrol episode came to light and the formation realized that it was serious business and there was a requirement of some form of immediacy. To sum up my observations on the missed opportunity, my opinion is we were totally surprised with the Pak troops occupying the heights dominating our positions along Drass, Kargil and Batalik sectors,” recounted the Brig Williams in vivid detail
When asked about the peculiar circumstances, political compulsions, and trigger for the Kargil conflict, Brig. Williams responded by saying, “The timing and the surprise element of launch were important factors for any kind of success. While as mentioned in my response to Question No. 1 above with regard to the artillery shelling on the Drass – Kargil road should have been an indicator of the pending threat, yet that was given a pass and the call of business as usual was being played at the cost of the impending mess.
“I would like to go back to February 1999 and pause for a moment on PM Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee’s famous bus yatra visit to Lahore in February 1999. The visit was important and seen as of great significance in improving the Indo Pak relations with supposed much good to follow. I fail to understand why our experts, military and civil did not see the body language of some key personnel in the Pakistani decision-making bodies. The video recordings of the visit with then General Parvez Musharraf meeting the India PM at the Governor’s house in Lahore and in the presence of Mr. Nawaz Sharief, the Pakistani PM should have resulted in some key observations.
“The startling revelation was the body language and mannerism of the General with his shirt sleeve rolled up to the forearms and his know all look. Such a body language reflected the political situation in Pakistan as it appeared that General Musharraf could not be bothered about either of the PMs present. A rift between the two Pakistani leaders was visible with the Chief having already made up his mind on the ‘When and where’ to execute the plan to capture select parts in the so called ‘Indian occupied Kashmir’. The plan had been made a decade earlier by his predecessor and mentor late Zia ul Haq.
“He was in a hurry to achieve his aim and with his very close-knit team had refined it with detailed timings of execution. The best possible timing for executing the plan was during early summer months, which actually meant less than three months since the historical meeting of the two adversarial Prime Ministers. Hence the timing was justified but the response from Indian forces was not meshed into his misplaced success options. What surprised Musharraf was the immediate action taken by the Indian military to evict the Pakistani intruders from the heights occupied by them. Pakistan had only planned a limited option and did not have the wherewithal to escalate to an all-out war. In fact, the Indian response with the use air power and move the flotilla at sea did result in conveying a strong message to Pakistan.”
Upon being asked about the duration of the war and the nature of the military exchanges which took place during the course of the conflict, he said, “It was termed as the 50-day war with the first action of Kalia patrol on 7 May till 26th July 1999, the date by which all Pakistani intruders were given an ultimatum to withdraw to their side of the Line of Control (LC). During this 50-day period, the initial skirmish at Kaksar in Kargil sector alerted the Indian Army and 8 Mtn Div was mobilized and deployed in Ladakh. In addition, Kashmir and other parts of J&K were alerted and the entire Indian Army began mobilization, besides the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy moving to their operational locations.
“With 8 Mountain Division having hurriedly moved across Zojila and spread from Matayan, the first village after crossing into Ladakh, up to Drass, the formation commanders and troops with little acclimatization started carrying out reconnaissance of the appreciated targets. The crisp orders given to the formation were given to evict the intruders at the earliest. Such an operational task required intelligence and maps, which remained a big challenge in execution of attacks launched hurriedly with little preparations.
“The initial attacks led to unacceptable casualties, but the game had to go on as pressures on eviction were mounting on commanders in the field. I believe it is here that experience in fighting in high attitude areas was the single most important factor for the leadership to understand the situation and reducing the number of casualties. It was the first few days of the limited war that the numbers, killed in action and wounded swelled, but repeated attacks along the steep spurs and slopes was the only option to maintain pressure and unnerve a determined enemy.
“The destruction of the Pak admin base Muntho Dhalo and other attacks on Point 4812 and 5203 in the Batlik Sector were the real start of successes in the entire Kargil Sector. The other attacks on Points 5165, 5140, 4280, Tololing, Tiger Hill and other features in Mushkoh Valley in Drass sector unnerved the Pakistani troops. Besides activating the Turtuk sector near Nubra were also huge successes. It was the unexpected speed of operation, which did result in a number of casualties but made the Pak PM hastily go to USA to request immediate mediation by the Clinton Administration to stop Indian forces from crossing the LC. It was in such measures that the limited war came to a hurried conclusion though much against the successful accomplishment of military objectives.
“However, what continues to baffle me to date is the question – ‘Why Pt 5353 in Drass sector was not captured?’ This feature which is between the two shoulders of Point 5240 and Point 5165, which were captured by the Indian troops was not attempted and if it was, then why was the feature not captured or occupied by our forces? The feature remains a thorn in the flesh of the Indian defences in the entire sector as it continues to dominate large tracts of Indian territory from the Sando bowl to Drass - Umbala road.”
Brigadier Williams took the occasion to remind the reader about the pivotal role the junior leadership played in turning the tide of battle and the cost at which it victory came, “The war was won only by grit and determination of the young officers who despite all odds led from the front. This is demonstrated by their firm commitment in achieving tasks given and for the sake of that magic word – “Izzat”.
In hindsight when I analyze the tasks given to the units and formations, I sometime feel that there was a lack of experience amongst some of our senior leadership to have made deadlines for completion of operations as all this had a lot to do with the term of the ‘Caretaker’ Government to call for elections. High altitude operations need a different outlook in ensuring success with minimal damages and casualties. Having said that for reasons best understood at the macro level, the bottom line to raise that green flag of success was by end June or early July, with the troop induction into the battle zone having been carried out by the end of May or thereabout.
“While I am sure the red flag was quite clearly visible, yet the military hierarchy chose to take their time in giving the operational situation the required attention it deserved, which may be indicative of the Chief of the Army Staff continuing with his visit to Europe. He did not consider the intrusion worrisome and hence did not immediately return to take stock of the military situation, which did result in delaying important decisions giving an opportunity to Pak troops to consolidate on their gains made by them in the Kargil sector.
“The delayed assessment of the operational situation led to delayed movement of our troops into the battle area and thereby resulting in delayed actions. Had the situation been somewhat accurately assessed then at least the logistical delays in terms of timely deployment of requisite high-altitude equipment could have taken place at a much faster pace and the troops appropriately geared to undertake the nigh impossible missions in real time.
“Hence, I would just like to reiterate that despite all the challenges and delays in deployment of the attacking force and the necessary wherewithal to include artillery and the ammunition, our troops led by junior leaders won the war for the country. This can be well appreciated with the ratio of officer: men casualties in battle, which was much higher than observed in previous wars and conflicts.”
Asked about the contribution of the individual services and their distinctive roles, the war veteran responded saying, “While it is neither a question of the war mainly being fought by the Army or by the Air Force, nor is the question of victory being attributed to one service over the other yet what needs to be understood is the importance of interoperability and mutual understanding. It must also not be forgotten that the man on the ground, who leads in war and more importantly at altitudes like Kargil, who must be always acknowledged and respected and perhaps for this reason the famous adage should oft be repeated.”
“When it was victory, the cavalier claimed it outright, the gunner boasted of his calibre, the engineer and signalman publicized their worth, but the infantryman stood silent with victory at his feet,” professed the veteran infantryman before going on to say“When we deep dive into the context of warfare, each arm and service have a major contribution to play in winning wars. The wherewithal to fight and make that combat power available to the man on the ground encompasses orchestration of all services and the air power remains a dominant factor in winning wars. In the initial battles of Kalubaar ridge and the destruction of the important Pakistani ‘Muntho Dhalo’ administrative base just across LC was successfully destroyed by the Air Force firing rockets and missiles staying well within our own territory, ensuring no violation of air space takes place.
“On other occasions the importance of recce missions undertaken by the Air Force and the supply drops carried out in support of the assaulting force remained a decisive factor in speeding up the operations. However, the bottom line of all victory was physical eviction of the intruders inside our own areas with a firm resolve and commitment of accomplishing the most challenging task at those heights. I must also mention with my personal knowledge and adequate experience operating at those altitudes that target acquisition by an aircraft flying at such high speeds is extremely difficult. Hence it is the man on the ground that has to seek and destroy the targets and give that tactical advantage required for victory.
Speaking about the role of the Indian Airforce in the Kargil War, the Brigadier said, “The role of the Air Force in the instant limited war was that of target acquisition and deterrence. From the standpoint of target acquisition: the Air Force was used to carry out extensive reconnaissance missions of areas which were difficult for to observe by ground forces and secondly the Air Force acted as a deterrence which gave a clear message to the adversaries not to escalate the extent of the operations.
“Some of the targets acquired and destroyed by the Indian Air Force have been mentioned in response to my previous question; however, the ‘Muntho Dhalo’ administrative base opposite the Batalik Sector was of great significance. During the initial days of the conflict the IAF suffered casualties, with a fighter aircraft brought down by Pak fire and Flying officer Kambampati Nichiketa Rao captured and taken a prisoner of war on 27 May 1999 by a Pakistani patrol led by Capt Rao Tahseen Ali. The second casualty was downing of a IAF helicopter between Tiger Hill – Point 4875.
“Although the Air Force claims of the successes of providing fire support to the Infantry by supposedly pulverized the target, yet I disagree with that claim and do not subscribe to such a story because of the difficult terrain and the claim of pinpoint target acquisition. The steep slopes and narrow ridgelines atop which the enemy was perched made them reasonably secure from being targeted with accuracy either by air or by artillery fire. However, air bursts at such altitudes were very effective and nerve racking.”
When asked about serious shortcomings in India’s defence mechanism, strategy and preparations and whether it enabled the enemy to occupy strategic dominating heights in Indian territory, he responded, “The extensive frontages of the Independent Brigade at Kargil resulted in wide gaps in defences, which were exploited by Pakistani troops and terrorists supported by them as they either occupied the heights or used the un-patrolled valleys for carrying out infiltration. While patrolling of such gaps was the key to prevent such misadventure yet the need of deploying advance surveillance systems to keep the gaps under check were not given due credence. What puzzles me most that some of the features in Drass sector like Tololing and Tiger Hill, besides the ridges close to these features were not kept under surveillance by the troops deployed.
“In fact, I will go a step further that the higher formation did not consider it important to allocate adequate air sorties to the local formation to carry out periodic air surveillance. Hence when the enemy was detected occupying such heights, our troops were taken by surprise and the way Pakistani troops were entrenched having made stone walls right along the ridge lines and some strong sangar like structures, only confirms that they were present at those heights much before the conflict.
“Due to lack of such operational intelligence the Indian Army was certainly unprepared to meet the challenge and put our troops in a tactically disadvantaged position during the initial phase of the conflict. Intelligence acquisition was supposedly being carried out by three if not more agencies, with very limited synergy between them. While the R&AW reported to their peers and up the chain on matters, which required immediate attention of the ground troops, the IB and military intelligence pleased their respective bosses for being the first to report. However, with each agency taking time in putting the picture together and then sharing inputs laterally the time lag was significant and was exploited by the enemy to its fullest. This was a major drawback and was rightly brought out in the Subramaniam Committee report, which was convened and presented after the war.
Recounting the initial setbacks and how they were overcome, he narrated, “The initial setbacks in War can be attributed to poor discernment of the threat. I subscribe to this view with the artillery firing on the road Drass - Kargil becoming more and more accurate since mid-1998 and no major steps taken to comprehend a possible threat. Merely changing the policy of convoy movement between the two towns without going into the ‘Why’ of the problem was a missed opportunity. Secondly the veracity of reports being given by the troops without confirmation or questioning by higher formations led to a reasonable lackadaisical approach amongst the ones responsible for guarding the area. I remember having visited Kargil from Srinagar by road around May – June 1998 and witnessing the firing along the road but that did not raise any alarm at the Kargil formation headquarter as the practice was considered as a routine activity.
“It was only after the 4 JAT patrol led by Capt Saurabh Kalia in early May 1999, that the intrusion came to light and immediately thereafter with the destruction of the ammunition dump in Kargil on 8th May 1999, that the Indian Army became wary of Pak designs and the intelligence apparatus was swung into action. The destruction of the ammunition dump could not have been possible unless there was a Pak observer directing the fire from a vantage point. Once the infiltrations were detected, the Indian Army moved fast and went into war even though they lacked some major combat equipment to include the high-altitude clothing making the troops vulnerable to the vagaries of weather and terrain.”
When asked about the lessons learnt by the army, he opined, “One of the most valuable lessons, which though learned after every conflict and yet not acted upon in all seriousness, is ‘Intelligence’. This has been the single most important failure in all conflict situations and more – so in our context as policy making by not taking steps to create a credible ‘Joint Intelligence Agency’ under one individual. This is different to ‘The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)’, which analyzes intelligence data from IB, R&AW, DGMI, DNI and the Directorate of Air Intelligence and is accountable to the Cabinet Secretariat.
With the appointment of CDS, some of the roles of JIC will perhaps come under the CDS. However, on ground the situation seems quite different with the NSC under the PM being key in all decision making. It is also important for timely dissemination of information and periodic review by the Intelligence Agency that will help in timely and appropriate action being taken at various levels.
Secondly the importance of having a well-trained, highly motivated force available to be deployed at short notice in the conflict area should be available. The concept of having such a force after much debate had been approved and created for high altitude warfare with much investment being done to equip and train this force. An example of such a force was the erstwhile ‘Himalayan Brigade’ established in the mid-eighties, however with a change in leadership, the concept became redundant and the newly formed special force disbanded. It was not long after the brigade’s reconversion that Kargil happened and the question of having a special force for high altitude was once again debated.
The third lesson as I perceive is to ensure a motivated young junior leadership for it is true that it is the young and motivated leader, which will lead his troops to victory. It is therefore axiomatic to understand the need of having sound senior military leadership who will keep their command motivated and ensure high morale of the younger leadership. I am equally sure that it is not the money that drives soldiers to give all they have in the accomplishment of a mission but in the respect and accountability of each one’s action.
The fourth and equally important lesson is to have a healthy and an unbiased feedback, which needs an open and free environment without fear of expression. Once that feeling is addressed and views heard then whatever decision is to follow, whether in sync with the view expressed by an individual or a group will be accepted most willingly and acted upon with a firm commitment. This is lacking because of either being pressurized of not speaking at a forum or being shoed away with the threat of the stick hanging in front of the person wanting to express.
The fifth and a very important lesson is that of training for the impending possible operation. There are no short cuts to training for war and all have to ensure that the more we sweat in training the more successful we are at war. This is also being forgotten by trying to justify those trainings can be done on sand models and digitally and saving funds rather than deploying troops on the ground and presenting live situations. There are no short cuts to training and no compromise on this aspect under the caveat of accruing savings for the more we sweat in peace the less we bleed in war.
Reiterating upon the contribution of the young officers in the outcome of the war, the former Bde Cdr stressed! “I have already articulated most unequivocally that it was essentially the ‘Junior Leadership’, which won the war for our Nation. Although they were briefed most sketchily by their senior commanders about the task at hand and without the maps and other details of enemy positions, yet they went, they saw, and they conquered. I remember meeting the young officers at the base of Tololing in Drass during the operation and was gratified to see their morale and wanting to be launched into the next task as early without worrying about the fatigue they had undergone over the days of their hurried deployment into battle zone.
“It is obvious that such enthusiasm also smacks of taking undue risks and being overconfident especially after a successful mission, which unfortunately was missed by our senior leadership as they failed to understand beyond just what met their eye, which in hindsight I will contribute toward their lack of combat experience at those difficult heights. A senior commander must never push a command beyond one’s limits of endurance and that comes with experience as it has to be felt and decisions taken even without listening to the willingness of troops fatigued to undertake yet another mission. I would think it was due to such decisions taken during the Kargil operations that resulted in heavy losses.”
He took the occasion to speak about the game change effect strong media-military relations had in turning the tide of war to the nation’s advantage and stressed how public opinion is paramount to warfighting, “I would certainly like to add one important and decisive factor on perception management and the important role played by the media. Media relations in the Kargil war were to some extent a game changer and had a direct impact on various actions taken at the apex level. It was the first televised war, which brought the war to the homes of all citizens and that was an important way of nurturing the rudiments of ‘National Will’, an important ‘Element of Power’ in a Nation State. A tacit support given by the citizen was a great motivator to the fighting spirit of the man deployed. Besides, the daily briefings and using other media tools including regular updates over the internet were positive influencers in macro decision making.
“The world looked at Pakistan as an aggressor and initiator of war. It also saw Pakistan as a liar as it did not initially acknowledge that their troops had been engaged in the conflict and refused to even accept the bodies of the slain Pak troops. However, the Indian media showed various documents to nail Pakistan in their missive till they finally accepted to take the bodies of their soldiers killed in action. What was brought about the acceptance theory was the interview telecast of Pak soldiers captured during conflict. Once Pak casualties from the Province of Punjab started mounting, Gen Musharraf came under direct pressure from the locals of Punjab as he too belonged to the same state and is a Mujahir.
“All these factors played a major role in lowering the morale of the infiltrators and resulting in ending the conflict. The evidence-based approach forced Nawaz Sharif to hurriedly visit USA, where he in no uncertain terms was given a diktat with clear timelines to withdraw their troops on their side of the Line of Control, thereby ensuring a complete withdrawal of all infiltrators by 26 July 1999,” concluded Brigadier Williams before sighing off.
About Brig. Rajiv Williams (Retd)
Brig. Rajiv Williams, YSM (Retd) took premature retirement from the Indian Army in 2005 and has since been engaged in CSR. A Postgraduate from Madras University in International Relations, he is a member of several strategic security related institutions and think tanks. He is presently Corporate Head – CSR with Jindal Stainless Limited, which is part of the OP Jindal Group and is responsible for planning and executing all Group CSR projects across the country.
As a member of the Governing Council of the Global Compact Network, Brig Williams has championed the initiative – ‘The India CEO Forum on Business and Human Rights’. He is a regular speaker/panelist at various forums and seminars and has been invited as a speaker to the United Nations offices in USA and Geneva. He also spoken at the Danish Institute of Human Rights, at Wilton Park, The UK and at seminars organized by Indian Industry Associations, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, GIZ, etc.
He is also a regular invitee to various discussions and consultations organized both by the Government as also by private bodies. A prolific writer, Brig Williams has written several articles on varied topics from conflict prevention & security to matters relating to Responsible Business & Corporate Citizenship. He has co-authored books on IMA and on Siachen, the latter one titled ‘The Long Road to Siachen the Question Why’ having been published by Rupa & Co. in 2011.